SARS among Critical Care Nurses, Toronto by Loeb, Mark et al.
To determine factors that predispose or protect health-
care workers from severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS), we conducted a retrospective cohort study among
43 nurses who worked in two Toronto critical care units with
SARS patients. Eight of 32 nurses who entered a SARS
patient’s room were infected. The probability of SARS
infection was 6% per shift worked. Assisting during intuba-
tion, suctioning before intubation, and manipulating the
oxygen mask were high-risk activities. Consistently wear-
ing a mask (either surgical or particulate respirator type
N95) while caring for a SARS patient was protective for the
nurses, and consistent use of the N95 mask was more pro-
tective than not wearing a mask. Risk was reduced by con-
sistent use of a surgical mask, but not significantly. Risk
was lower with consistent use of a N95 mask than with con-
sistent use of a surgical mask. We conclude that activities
related to intubation increase SARS risk and use of a mask
(particularly a N95 mask) is protective. 
S
evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was first
recognized in Canada in early March 2003 (1). Caused
by a novel strain of coronavirus, the disease was reported
in more than 8,400 people globally, with cases in Asia,
Europe, and North America in 2003 (2–4). SARS is asso-
ciated with substantial illness and death. The case-fatality
rate has been estimated at 13% for patients <60 years and
43% for those >60 years (5). In Canada, disease transmis-
sion has occurred predominantly among healthcare work-
ers within the healthcare setting (1). Preventing SARS
transmission to healthcare workers is therefore an impor-
tant priority (6). 
Little is known about SARS risk factors for healthcare
workers. Determining patient care activities that pose a
high risk for infection and possible protective measures for
healthcare workers may inform strategies for prevention
and may elucidate SARS transmission. Recommended
protective equipment for healthcare workers caring for
patients with SARS includes a particulate respirator mask
(N95) and a goggle or face shield, gown, and gloves (7,8).
One report from Hong Kong has suggested that surgical
and N95 masks are protective (9), but few data exist to
support the recommendations. 
SARS poses a special challenge for healthcare workers
who care for the critically ill. Many SARS patients are in
critical care units. In a Toronto case series, 29 (20%) of
144 SARS patients were admitted to the intensive care unit
(ICU) and 20 (69%) of these 29 received mechanical ven-
tilation (10). The close interaction of staff and patients and
the nature of invasive patient care activities, such as intu-
bation and other procedures that involve potential expo-
sure to respiratory secretions, raise important questions
about the risk for healthcare workers working in critical
care units. 
To determine risk factors for SARS, we conducted a
retrospective cohort study among nurses who worked in
two critical care units in a Toronto hospital. We hypothe-
sized that patient care activities (e.g., intubating, suction-
ing of endotracheal tubes, and administering nebulizers)
that increase exposure to respiratory droplets are associat-
ed with an increased risk for SARS transmission and that
masks protect against infection. 
Methods
Study Setting and Population
Hospital A is a 256-bed community hospital that pro-
vides medical, surgical, obstetric, and pediatric care in the
Greater Toronto Area. On March 7, 2003, the 42-year-old
son (patient A) of the index patient in the Toronto SARS
outbreak (1) was seen in the emergency department. He
was admitted to the hospital’s 10-bed ICU on March 8.
Patient A stayed in the ICU until March 13, the date of his
death due to SARS. On March 17, a 77-year-old man
(patient B) who had been exposed to patient Ain the emer-
gency room on March 7 was admitted to the ICU. He
stayed there until his death due to SARS on March 21.
Patient C, another emergency room contact of patient A,
was admitted to the hospital’s 15-bed coronary care unit
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another hospital’s ICU, where he stayed until his death
from SARS on March 29. Nurses who worked one or more
shifts in hospital A’s ICU from March 8 to 13 and from
March 17 to 21 (i.e., when a SARS patient was in the unit)
were included in the cohort. Similarly, nurses who worked
one or more shifts from March 14 to March 16 in hospital
A’s CCU were included. 
Measurements
We recorded the age, sex, and medical history of the
nursing staff, including history of any respiratory illness,
smoking, conditions that might result in immunosuppres-
sion, and use of immunosuppressive medications. Using a
standardized data collection form, trained research nurses
abstracted information regarding the patient care activities
administered by the critical care nurses. To link particular
nurses to activities performed in SARS patients’rooms, we
identified nurses’ signatures on patient charts by using a
master list of signatures provided by the CCUs. Data col-
lection included type and duration of patient care activities
performed. The types of personal protection equipment
(goggles, face shield, surgical mask, glove, gown, N95
mask) and the duration and frequency of using the equip-
ment when caring for SARS patients were recorded.
Information from the charts was then used to interview
nurses about the specific care provided during their shifts.
Information provided by the nurses was corroborated
whenever possible by data from the charts.
Case Definition
We used Health Canada’s case definition for suspected
or probable SARS cases (11). A suspected case was
described as fever (>38° C), cough or breathing difficulty,
and one or more of the following exposures during the
10 days before onset of symptoms: close contact with a
person with suspected or probable SARS, recent travel to
an area with recent local SARS transmission outside
Canada, recent travel or visit to an identified setting in
Canada where SARS exposure might have occurred. A
probable case was defined as a suspected SARS case with
radiographic evidence of infiltrates consistent with pneu-
monia or respiratory distress syndrome or a suspected
SARS case with autopsy findings consistent with patho-
logic features of respiratory distress syndrome without
identifiable cause. The case definitions are in accordance
with the World Health Organization’s clinical case defini-
tions (12). All three source patients met the definition for
probable SARS cases. For this study, we assessed out-
comes for each nurse from the first exposure to a source
patient until 10 days (one incubation period) after the last
exposure (March 8–April 3 for nurses in ICU and March
14–26 for nurses in CCU). Nurses who met the suspected
or probable case definition and the three SARS source
patients (patients A, B, and C) were tested for antibodies
against SARS-associated coronavirus by immunofluores-
cence (EUROIMMUN, Luebeck, Germany).
Statistical Analysis
Fischer’s exact two-sided tests were used to assess risk
factors. Exact confidence intervals (CI) were reported. A
Kaplan-Meier survival curve was constructed. Data were
analyzed by using EpiInfo 2000 (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA) and SAS version 8.0
(SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC). 
Results
Forty-three nurses worked at least one shift in a critical
care unit where there was a patient with SARS; 37 worked
in ICU and 6 in CCU. Eight nurses were infected with
SARS, four who worked only in the ICU, three who
worked only in the CCU, and one ICU nurse who worked
one shift in the CCU. All cohort nurses were female; the
mean age was 41 years (range 27–65 years). Only two
nurses had a history of respiratory illness (one asthma, one
bronchitis). Illness onset for the eight nurses was March
16–21. The most common symptoms included fever (8
[100%] of 8), myalgia (7 [87.5%] of 8), cough (6 [75%] of
8) and chills (6 [75%] of 8). Five nurses (62.5%) had
headaches, and four (50%) had shortness of breath. Of the
eight nurses, four (probable SARS case-patients) had uni-
lateral infiltrates on chest radiograph and four (suspected
SARS case-patients) had normal chest radiographs. SARS
diagnosis in these eight nurses and in the three SARS
source patients was confirmed by serology.
Patient Care Activities
Relative infection risk for 23 patient care activities is
shown in Table 1. None of the 11 nurses who did not enter
a SARS patient’s room became ill. Our analysis was thus
limited to the 32 nurses who entered a SARS patient’s
room at least once. Three patient care activities were asso-
ciated with SARS infection: intubating (relative risk [RR]
4.20, 95% CI 1.58 to 11.14, p = 0.04); suctioning before
intubation (4.20 RR, 95% CI 1.58 to 11.14, p = 0.04); and
manipulating an oxygen mask (9.0 RR, 95% CI 1.25 to 64.
9, p ≤ 0.01). 
Personal Protective Equipment 
Use of personal protective equipment and history of
high-risk patient care activities among SARS-infected
nurses are summarized in Table 2. Relative risk for SARS
infection and use of personal protective equipment is sum-
marized in Table 3. Three (13%) of 23 nurses who consis-
tently wore a mask (either surgical or N95) acquired SARS
compared to 5 (56%) of 9 nurses who did not consistently
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RR for infection was 0.22 (95%CI 0.05 to 0.93, p = 0.06)
when nurses who always wore an N95 mask (2 SARS-
infected and 14 noninfected nurses) were compared with
nurses who did not wear any mask (N95 or surgical mask)
consistently (5 SARS-infected and 4 noninfected nurses).
The RR for infection was 0.45 (95%CI 0.07 to 2.71, p =
0.56) when nurses who always wore a surgical mask (one
SARS-infected and three noninfected nurses) were com-
pared with nurses who did not wear any mask (N95 or sur-
gical mask) consistently (five SARS-infected and four for
non-SARS nurses). The difference for SARS infection for
nurses who consistently wore N95 masks and those who
consistently wore surgical masks was not significant (RR
0.5, 95% CI 0.06 to 4.23, p = 0.5). 
Time to Event
A Kaplan-Meier curve of the 32 nurses in the cohort
who entered a SARS patient’s room is shown in Figure.
The figure demonstrates onset of symptoms by number of
shifts worked. It shows that if all nurses had worked eight
shifts, 53% of them would become infected with SARS.
The probability of SARS infection was 6% (8/143) per
shift worked. 
Discussion
We found that critical care nurses who assisted with
suctioning before intubation and intubation of SARS
patients were four times more likely to become infected
than nurses who did not. Manipulation of a SARS patient’s
oxygen mask was also a high-risk factor. Our findings
support reports that exposure to respiratory secretions or
activities that generate aerosols can result in SARS trans-
mission to healthcare workers (13).
The 11 nurses in our study who did not enter a SARS
patient’s room did not become infected. This finding,
along with the finding that respiratory care activities pose
high risk, implicates either droplet or limited aerosol gen-
eration as a means of transmission to healthcare workers.
The finding is compatible with the relative high risk (6%
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Table 1. Relative risk of critical care nurses acquiring SARS by patient care activity  
SARS attack rate 
(No. cases/No. exposed or unexposed) (%) 
Patient care activity   Exposed  Unexposed  Relative risk (95% CI)  p value 
Intubation  3/4 (75)  5/28 (18)  4.20 (1.58 to 11.14)  0.04 
Suctioning before intubation  3/4 (75)  5/28 (18)  4.20 (1.58 to 11.14)  0.04 
Suctioning after intubation  4/19(21)  4/13(31)  0.68 (0.21 to 2.26)  0.68 
Nebulizer treatment   3/5(20)  5/27 (8)  3.24 (1.11 to 9.42)  0.09 
Manipulation of oxygen mask  7/14 (50)  1/18 (6)  9.00 (1.25 to 64.89)  0.01 
Manual ventilation  2/7 (29)  6/25 (24)  1.19 (0.30 to 4.65)  1.00 
Mouth or dental care  5/21 (24)  3/11(27)  0.87 (0.25 to 2.99)  1.00 
Insertion of a nasogastric tube  2/6 (33)  6/26 (23)  1.44 (0.38 to 5.47)  0.62 
Insertion of an indwelling urinary catheter  2/2 (100)  6/30(0.20)  5.00 (2.44 to 10.23)  0.06 
Insertion of a peripheral intravenous catheter  3/5 (60)  5/27 (19)  3.24 (1.11 to 9.42)  0.09 
Chest tube insertion or removal  0 (0)  0 (0)     
Insertion of a central venous catheter  2/6 (33)  6/26 (23)  1.44 (0.38 to 5.47)  0.62 
Bathing or patient transfer  7/26 (27)  1/6 (17)  1.62 (0.24 to 10.78)  1.00 
Manipulation of BiPAP mask  3/6 (50)  5/26 (19)  2.60 (0.8 to 7.99)  0.15 
Administration of medication  5/23 (22)  3/ 9 (33)  0.65 (0.20 to 2.18)  0.65 
Performing an electrocardiogram  4/12 (33)  4/20 (20)  1.67 (0.51 to 5.46)  0.43 
Venipuncture  6/17 (35)  2/ 15 (13)  2.65 (0.63 to 11.19)  0.23 
Manipulation of commodes or bedpans  3/5 (60)  5/ 27 (19)  3.24 (1.11 to 9.42)  0.09 
Feeding  2/10 (20)  6/22 (27)  0.73 (0.18 to 3.02)  1.00 
Debrillation  0/2 (0)  8/ 30 (0.27)    1.00 
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation  0/3 (0)  8/29 (28)    0.55 
Chest physiotherapy  2/7 (29)  6/25 (0.24)  1.19 (0.30 to 4.65)  1.00 
Assessment of patient  6/ 23 (26)  2/ 9 (22)  1.17 (0.29 to 4.77)  1.00 
Insertion of peripheral intravenous line  1/1 (100)  7/31 (23)  4.43 (2.31 to 8.50)  0.25 
Endotracheal aspirate  3/12 (25)  5/ 20 (25)  1.00 (0.29 to 3.45)  1.00 
Bronchoscopy  1/2 (50)  7/ 30 (23)  2.14 (0.46 to 9.90)  0.44 
Radiology procedures  4/15(26)  4/17 (24)  1.13 (0.34 to 3.76)  1.00 
Dressing change  1/6 (17)  7/26 (27)  0.62 (0.09 to 4.13)  1.00 
Urine specimen collected  1/2 (50)  7/30 (23)  2.14 (0.46 to 9.90)  0.44 
Fecal specimen collected  0/1 (0)  8/31(26)    1.00 
Rectal swab obtained  0/1 (0)  8/31 (26)    1.00 
Nasopharyngeal swab obtained  0/2 (0)  8/30 (27)    1.00 
Other  2/5 (40)  6/27 (22)  1.80 (0.50 to 6.50)  0.58 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; CI, confidence interval. per shift worked) of critical care nurses. Our results did
not implicate environmental transmission (i.e., contact
through gowns) as a major risk factor. These data are in
keeping with the report by Scales and colleagues,
in which activities associated with droplet or limited
aerosol spread were implicated as important sources of
transmission (14).
We found a near 80% reduction in risk for infection for
nurses who consistently wore masks (either surgical or
N95). This finding is similar to that of Seto and colleagues,
who found that both surgical masks and N95 masks were
protective against SARS among healthcare workers in
Hong Kong hospitals (9). When we compared use of N95
to use of surgical masks, the relative SARS risk associated
with the N95 mask was half that for the surgical mask;
however, because of the small sample size, the result was
not statistically significant. Our data suggest that the N95
mask offers more protection than a surgical mask. 
This study focused on critical care nurses working at
the first SARS hospital outbreak in Toronto. Since use of
personal protective equipment was not standardized during
the study period, it was possible to assess the effect of per-
sonal protective equipment. The use of personal protective
equipment was highly variable because the nurses were
often unaware that their patients had SARS. Our results
highlight the importance of using personal protective
equipment when caring for SARS patients. We estimate
that if the entire cohort had used masks consistently, SARS
risk would have been reduced from 6% to 1.4% per shift.
A limitation of this study is that it is retrospective.
Recall bias on the part of the critical care nurses is a pos-
sibility. We believe that by verifying the information pro-
vided (e.g., patient care activities) using medical records,
and using the medical records to cue the interviewed nurs-
es, we minimized recall bias. Any prospective evaluation
(e.g., using an observer in ICU) after the initial outbreak
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Table 2. Summary of exposure, personal protective equipment, and participation in high-risk activities of the nurses in whom SARS 
developed
a 
Nurse  No. of shifts  Location of shift 
Total duration of exposure  
to index patient
b (min) 
Personal protection used when  
inside SARS patient’s room 
Participation in high risk 
activities
c 
1  3  ICU  60  Gown 
Gloves 
Surgical mask 
 
2  3  ICU  385  Gown 
Gloves 
N95 
Goggles
d 
Intubation, suctioning 
before intubation 
3  3  ICU
e  190  Gown
d 
Gloves
d 
N95
d 
Suctioning before 
intubation 
4  5  ICU  935  Gloves 
Gown
d 
Goggles
d 
N95
d 
Intubation, suctioning 
before intubation 
5  3  ICU  555  Gloves 
Gown 
N95 
Goggles
d 
Intubation 
6  2  CCU  510  None   
7  2  CCU  40  None   
8  2  CCU  510  Gloves
d   
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; ICU, intensive care unit; CCU, coronary care unit. 
bDuration of exposure is defined as time spent in a SARS patient’s room. 
cIntubation, suctioning before intubation. 
dIndicates that use of this precaution was inconsistent (was not used on one or more occasions). 
eNurse 3 worked one shift in coronary care unit. 
Table 3. Nurses’ risk of acquiring SARS based on use of personal protective equipment
a  
Attack rate (%) according to personal 
protective equipment used 
Type of personal protective equipment  Consistent  Inconsistent  Relative risk (95% CI)  2-Tailed Fisher exact p value 
Gown  3/20 (15)  5/12 (42)  0.36 (0.10 to 1.24)  0.12 
Gloves  4/22 (18)  4/10 (40)  0.45 (0.14 to 1.46)  0.22 
N95 or surgical mask  3/23 (13)  5/9 (56)  0.23 (0.07 to 0.78)  0.02 
N95
a  2/16 (13)  5/9 (56)  0.22 (0.05 to 0.93)  0.06 
Surgical mask
b  1/4 (25)  5/9 (56)  0.45 (0.07 to 2.71)  0.56 
N95 versus surgical mask
c  2/16 (13)  1/4 (25)  0.50 (0.06 to 4.23)  0.51 
aSARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; CI, confidence interval. 
bThe comparator is use of no mask. The denominator n (total=32) changes for these comparisons as the nurses who consistently used the indicated personal protective 
equipment were compared to nurses who wore no masks.  
cConsistent use of the N95 mask versus consistent use of a surgical mask. The denominator n (total=32) changes for these comparisons as the nurses who consistently 
used the indicated personal protective equipment were compared to the indicated unique group, rather than to the rest of the nurses. would have been limited by uniformity in use of personal
protective equipment (i.e., use of N95 masks, gowns,
gloves, goggles). We acknowledge that the study cohort
was small, and this limits inferences that can be made.
Nevertheless, these data support current recommendations
for use of N95 masks and for special precautions when
performing intubations on SARS patients. 
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Figure. Onset of symptoms for severe acute respiratory syndrome
by number of shifts worked (dashed lines represent 95% confi-
dence limits).